Canadian
troops moving anti-tank gun
into position during street
fighting in Ortona, 21 December
1943.
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| Photo
by Terry F. Rowe. Department of
National Defence / National Archives
of Canada, PA-107935. |
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The
Attack
In action an infantry battalion commander,
for example, would receive orders from his
brigade commander to carry out an assignment.
To carry it out he would formulate a plan
based on his specific task and reconnaissance
of the ground, and then hold an "O"
or Orders group to convey instructions to
his officers. The plan would depend, in
part, on the dispositions of friendly and
enemy troops as well as the supplies and
supporting weapons available-for example,
a plan might be dependent on tactical air
support from fighter-bombers.
In basic terms, an objective or objectives
would be chosen, usually some tactically
or strategically important feature like
a ridge or a town. The use of ground for
concealment and to allow the greatest amount
of covering fire to be brought to bear was
of utmost importance while troops proceeded
from assembly areas to the "forming
up place" or FUP and thence into battle.
Supporting artillery fire plans would be
drawn up to help cover movement by forcing
the enemy to keep his head down. The infantry
used fire and movement tactics to manoeuvre,
i.e. one sub-unit would fire to cover the
advance of another. By these methods the
attackers would close to their objective,
where unless the enemy had withdrawn, close-quarters
fighting would ensue. Assuming the attack
to be successful, the next steps were consolidation-reorganization
of survivors and preparation of defences
to repel counter-attacks-and "mopping-up"
to clear the area of any remaining enemy
soldiers. One of the key concerns in both
the selection of objectives and the preparation
of defences once objectives were reached
was to ensure that anti-tank guns could
be swiftly moved up, as German doctrine
called for defence in depth with lightly-held
front line positions which would, upon penetration,
be immediately subjected to armoured counter-attack.
A reserve force would always be maintained
to allow some flexibility in the execution
of the commander's plan. It is important
to remember that despite the text-book methods
laid down in training manuals, casualties,
the fog of war, and not least the enemy
often played havoc with the most carefully
thought-out plans.
Princess
Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
in action over a rise, near
Valguarnera, Sicily, 20 July
1943. Enemy heavy trucks are
ablaze in the distance.
|
| Photo
by Frank Royal. Department of
National Defence / National Archives
of Canada, PA-163670. |
|
Defence
It having been recognized that linear defences
like the trench lines of the Great War would
be unable to withstand a modern attack, British
doctrine during the Second World War prescribed
a system of defended localities where the
ground commanding a given area would be manned
by infantry and their supporting arms, setting
up positions of all-round defence to prevent
the enemy from moving through that area. A
mobile reserve was to be maintained to counter-attack
any enemy penetration. Front line positions,
therefore, were not continuous as in the earlier
war, but fluid and mutually-supporting. As
with the selection of objectives in the attack,
defensive positions were determined in accordance
with the anti-tank plan. Defensive methods
included, aside from the obvious weapons fire,
concealment and camouflage to gain surprise,
use of ground-particularly reverse slope positions-to
allow freedom of movement without fear of
enemy observation, deception techniques such
as the use of "dummy" defences,
observation posts to gain information about
the enemy, outpost lines forward of main defences
to create depth, and the building of obstacles
covered by fire, such as minefields or anti-tank
barriers, to channel the enemy into areas
more favourable to the defenders, the goal
being to "[lead] the enemy into areas
where he can most effectively be destroyed"
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