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The Creation of the
Home War Establishment (HWE)
Long before WWII broke out, the Canadian
government, concerned by the development
of hostile naval and air forces in the Atlantic
and Pacific oceans, had considered organizing
the defence of Canada’s territory.
In the 1930s, as tension grew between Japan
and the U.S., a naval war in the Pacific
became a definite possibility for many observers.
As an ally of the U.S., Canada was relying
on the U.S. Navy to fight off a Japanese
attack on its western seashore. The Department
of National Defence believed the Air Force,
on account of its speed and range, was best
suited to counter armed raids against the
vast and sparely populated territory of
British Columbia. As a result, the Royal
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) established Western
Air Command (WAC) on March 1st, 1938, and
started building facilities to support a
Pacific Coast-based air force.
 A
Canso crew serving on maritime
patrols along the Atlantic seaboard.
In blister, Sergeant A. Skee,
next to Leading Aircraftman L.D.
Allgood. Standing from left to
right, Warrant Officer Class 2
C.C. Hogleth, Flying Officer E.C.
Snider, Flight Lieutenant J.W.
Langmuir, Captain, and Flight
Sergeant M.W. Paul. |
| National
Defence Image Library, PL 16700. |
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The September 1938 Munich crisis was evidence
enough that war in Europe was as serious
a threat. To be ready, the RCAF set up its
Eastern Air Command (EAC) on September 15th,
1938, and prepared a new defence plan that
included building bases and deploying squadrons
in the Maritimes. Both the western and eastern
commands were placed under the Home War
Establishment (HWE).
At the end of 1939, the HWE was comprised
of 14 active squadrons, including No 110
(Army Cooperation) Squadron soon to be detached
to serve overseas with the First Infantry
Division. Only two of the other squadrons
had the airplanes to carry out their mission:
No 1 (Fighter) Squadron with seven Hawker
Hurricanes, and No 11 (Bomber-Reconnaissance)
Squadron with ten Lockheed Hudson. A far
cry from the 16 squadrons and 574 aircraft
allotted to the HWE in the air defence plan.
An enemy attack against Canadian territory
was a definite threat in 1939; this became
even more likely in the summer of 1940,
if ever Great Britain were to fall. The
fear of an air or naval assault reached
its peak in 1941 when Japan dealt a mighty
blow to the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor. In
March 1942,
Air Vice-Marshal L.S. Breadner summarized
the dangers that Canada was facing in those
words:
The changing war situation makes it expedient
that Canada increase Air Defences to deal
more effectively with the following dangers
to Supply Life Line to the United Kingdom
and our own existence as a nation:
- greatly increased enemy U-boat sinkings
of our merchant shipping in the Western
Atlantic;
- possible enemy aircraft attacks on
vital targets in East and West Coast
regions;
- possible bombardment of East and
West Coast ports by enemy naval ships;
and
- possible invasion of Canadian Pacific
Coast by enemy seaborne and air-borne
forces.
To face those challenges, Breadner drafted
a revised plan. He asked that the HWE be
increased to 49 squadrons, which meant Canada
had to buy 380 Hurricane fighters, 244 Mosquito
bombers, 144 Canso flying boats, 40 Vultee
Vengeance light bombers, plus transport
aircraft: the total price tag was estimated
at CAN$151 million. This also meant adding
989 officers and 11,347 airmen, for an additional
cost of CAN$216 million.
The 49-squadron plan was approved by the
Canadian government but never completed.
From the beginning the HWE was plagued by
difficulties and unable to secure the men,
aircraft and bases that its objectives demanded.
The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan
(BCATP) did provide training grounds and
air crews, but Article 15 of the agreement
signed with Great Britain specified what
percentage of Canadian crews were to be
sent overseas and what percentage were to
serve with territorial defence, and that
quota did not allow the HWE to secure the
men it needed.
The situation was even worse when it came
to planes and spare parts. Until the U.S.
went to war in December 1941, their neutrality
act forbade exporting military planes to
belligerent nations. In addition, within
the Commonwealth, the RAF and the BCATP
had precedence over the HWE and received
all the planes manufactured in Great Britain.
During the first months of WWII, the squadrons
that defended Canada’s seashores were
unable to obtain the modern aircraft they
required.
And things did not really improve. On April
22nd, 1941, the Anglo-American Joint Aircraft
Committee was created to oversee aircraft
production in all Allied countries, and
supervise the distribution of planes and
spare parts in agreement with war priorities.
Great Britain and the U.S. denied Canada
a seat on the committee, which never was
very amenable to RCAF requests. As a result,
Canadian squadrons conducting anti-submarine
warfare were severely handicapped by the
lack of planes and lagged behind their British
counterparts from a technical point of view.
The HWE also had to face difficulties inherent
to the sheer size of the territory under
its protection, to its sparse population
and to its climate. It had to cover barely
inhabited, godforsaken coasts that stretched
for miles on end. Transporting crews and
equipment to those locations in order to
build bases and airfields was a titanic
challenge. Morale and efficiency suffered
in those isolated, remote locations. Moreover,
the unpredictable weather of coastal areas,
especially as one goes up north, with their
strong winds and pervasive fog often rendered
surveillance missions perilous, if not impossible.
In 1939 it would have been
easy for enemy aircraft to reach Canada’s
Atlantic or Pacific shores and to enter
its air space without being detected.
Canada had no radar alert system. To counter
such possibility, the Royal Canadian Air
Force (RCAF) established the Aircraft
Detection Corps (ADC) in May 1940. The
principle was quite straightforward and
inexpensive: unpaid civilians were enlisted
to monitor the air space and to warn the
RCAF of any suspicious activity. The
Air Detection Corps
On the West Coast
In the area under WAC, the Sea Island airfield,
where the Vancouver civilian airport is
located, became the RCAF’s first base.
Aerodromes and flying boat bases were multiplied
to ensure coastal surveillance: Patricia
Bay, Ucluelet, Tofino, Coal Harbour and
Port Hardy on Vancouver Island; Bella Coola
and Prince Rupert in the more remote areas;
Alliford Bay on the Queen Charlotte Islands.
Japan’s attack of Pearl Harbor on
December 7th, 1941, heralded the extension
of the war to the Pacific. When Japan declared
war on the U.S. and Great Britain, Canada
had to reinforce its protective measures
on the West Coast. That alert, however,
was short-lived: the likelihood of an invasion
or even of armed raids decreased significantly
after the U.S. victory at Midway on June
4th, 1942. But the population of British
Columbia remained traumatized by the possibility
of a Japanese attack and worried over the
presence of many Canadians of Japanese descent
in its midst. To address the concerns expressed
by the local population and its politicians,
the federal government maintained on the
West Coast a more powerful air force than
what was actually called for, despite the
fact that the threat posed by U-boat attacks
on the Atlantic seashore was increasing.
HWE airmen did not expect
to serve beyond Canadian borders. Yet,
this is what happened in 1942. At the
height of the Pacific war, fearing a Japanese
assault against the northernmost areas
of the Pacific Coast, the U.S. requested
Canada’s help. The
Kiska Air Battle
By 1943, Western Air Command had gained
significant power and found its balance.
Squadrons assigned to the protection of
the northern sector formed No 4 Group, with
headquarters in Prince-Rupert. No 2 Group’s
HQ at Jericho Bay (Vancouver) was in charge
of the southern sector of the B.C. coast.
New fighter squadrons were created: Nos.
132, 133 and 135 at Patricia Bay, No 163
at Sea Island. New planes were available:
Canso A flying boats to replace the aging
and increasingly unreliable Stanraers, twin-engine
Lockheed-Vega Venturas in place of the old
Bolingbrokes of Nos. 8, 115 and 149 Squadrons.
By the end of 1943, radar stations recently
built along the coast ensured an almost
complete coverage of the seashore’s
air space. In that same year, the air base
and airfield construction programme was
now focusing on the hinterland to improve
the staging route network.
Well-organized but without a specific enemy
threat to deal with, Western Air Command
in the war’s last years emphasized
mobility and speed of tactical response
to any potential attack.
The East Coast and the
Battle of the Atlantic
In the East, Eastern Air Command (EAC)
was tasked with coordinating air defence
in the Atlantic region. The Dominion of
Newfoundland – not yet a part of Canada
– was placed under Canadian military
protection so that EAC territory included
Eastern Quebec, Labrador, Newfoundland,
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward
Island.
EAC headquarters were located in Halifax,
next to those of the Royal Canadian Navy
(RCN), since maritime protection entails
close cooperation between navy and air force.
A network of air force bases expanded rapidly:
Halifax, Dartmouth, Yarmouth, Sydney, Gander,
Torbay, Bagotville. Flying boat bases were
built in Gaspé, Shelburne, and Botwood.
The Air Force’s role on the East
Coast was to be worked out as early as September
1939 when the first transatlantic convoy,
HX-1, left Halifax. The Stanraer flying
boats of No 5 (Bomber-Reconnaissance) Squadron
patrolled the approaches of Halifax Harbour
to locate possible enemy submarines; as
the convoy put out to sea, they ensured
aerial protection within a 400-km radius.
This was only about one-third of the plane’s
actual range but one had to take into account
the trip back to the base and adverse winds.
Starting in November 1939, the Dartmouth-based
11 Squadron’s Lockheed Hudson made
it possible to extend the range of patrols
to 550 km. Bolingbroke and Digby bombers
were also used. During the war’s early
years the best performing plane for naval
escort duty remained the Consolidated Catalina
flying boat (or Canso under its Canadian
version), with an effective range of 960
km. Unfortunately, EAC’s squadrons
did not receive those aircraft before June
1941, as U-boat attacks against Allied convoys
got as close as 1000 km off the coats of
Newfoundland.
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A
Lockheed Hudson Mk I bomber and
reconnaissance aircraft flying
over a minesweeper, August 15th,
1940. |
| National
Defence Image Library, PL 1186. |
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Until 1942, RCAF air patrols were no serious
threat to U-boats: insufficient training,
lack of experience, inadequate equipment,
all those factors prevented Canadian airmen
from getting significant results against
German submarines. In Great Britain, Coastal
Command aircraft were equipped with radar
systems and Torpex depth charges, set to
explode in shallow waters. It would be month
before their Canadian counterparts could
get such equipment.
The technical progress made by the British
finally reached Canada. For instance, RAF-sponsored
research showed that lookout men tended
to watch the horizon rather than straight
above, simply because it was less tiring.
An aircraft painted white under and dark
grey above disappears against the sky’s
brightness. It can therefore get much closer
to a U-boat before being detected, drop
down on it and launch its depth charges
before the submarine can dive. RCAF Squadron
Leader N.E. Small, 113 (BR) Squadron, must
be credited for introducing white camouflage
and raising flight altitude from 1,200 to
1,500 metres, a strategy that earned him
a kill against U-754.
The U-Boat was on the surface
heading 240° moving at 8-10 knots.
Pilot throttled back fully and dove, manoeuvering
to attack from astern dead along track
of U-Boat.
Attack
on U-754 by Hudson 625 of 113 (BR) Squadron,
July 31st, 1942
Then coming so unexpected
the excited voice of the co-pilot F/S
Duncan “Submarine” immediately
I jumped to my feet and opened the blister,
the white wash of the submarine was very
attracting against the green ocean as
it darted threw the water like a ball
out of hell. I quickly unfastened the
gun…
Attack
on U-604 by Canso of 5 (BR) Squadron,
February 24th, 1943
Despite the presence of RCAF squadrons
along the eastern seashore, there remained
in the middle of the Atlantic a weak spot,
too far from the shore to be covered by
the Canso. The RCAF’s repeated requests
for very-long range bombers were not met
before the summer of 1943. No 10 (Bomber-Reconnaissance)
Squadron was then provided with four-engine
Lockheed B-24 Liberator bombers modified
to be able cross the Atlantic and equipped
with U.S.-made ASG radars. 10 Squadron’s
Liberators were to play a key role in the
September 1943 campaign launched by U-boats
against transatlantic convoys.
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Liberator “P”
of 10 (BR) Squadron patrolling
over Newfoundland’s coast,
spring 1943.
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| National
Defence Image Library, PL 36938. |
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The U-Boat began to fire
flak, putting up a heavy curtain of fire
with at times as many as fifty bursts
in the air at one time. The aircraft returned
fire intermittently for one hour and nine
minutes, approximately at 1211/Z the U-Boat
was observed to start crash dive and aircraft
turned in for attack.
Attack
on U-420 by Liberator “A”
of 10 (BR) Squadron, October 26th, 1943
Allied successes against German submarines
in 1943 led to changes in the doctrine on
maritime patrols, such as conducted by Canso
and Liberator squadrons. Warned of approaching
U-boats by land-based radio-detection stations,
by the decipherment of wireless communications
and by British intelligence services, EAC
would send out patrols to locate, and attack
them. They were to maintain contact with
the EAC at all times, in order to allow
the RCAF and RCN enough time to dispatch
a combined force to sustain the offensive
effort.
Unfortunately, cooperation between the
Air Force and the Navy, although it is essential
to the success of anti-submarine operations,
was often marred by an ancient and deeply
rooted attitude of distrust among RCAF superior
officers, wary that the RCN may take over
air operations. This was, however, the way
things worked in Great Britain, where the
RAF’s Coastal Command was taking its
orders from the Admiralty. In Canada, the
situation did not improve after a first
restructuring following the Anglo-American
agreement signed in the fall of 1941 that
placed the naval forces in the Atlantic
under U.S. command. The RCN followed unwillingly
the orders of the U.S. admiral based at
Argentia; the RCAF, for its part, tried
to maintain its autonomy by arguing that
its responsibilities extended beyond escort
and submarine warfare operations. It is
only in the spring of 1943, following another
reorganization of British, U.S, and Canadian
forces involved in merchantmen protection,
that better communications were made possible.
With the creation of the Northwest Atlantic
Operations Theatre on April 30th, 1945,
which was placed under the command of Rear-Admiral
L.W. Murray [can-pep-can-murray-e.doc].
RCAF anti-submarine operations came under
the responsibility of the RCN, thus allowing
for improved coordination. The EAC commanding
officer remained, however, in charge of
general operational control.
Indeed, the EAC had to face other requirements
besides the fight against U-boats. It had
a responsibility of protecting certain inland
war-essential industrial facilities that
could be targeted by special operations.
In 1942 and 1943, the Canadian government
set up a network of radar stations and deployed
fighter and interception squadrons along
the East Coast, to seal off any possibility
of an enemy intrusion. It is quite unlikely
that an enemy could reach central Canada
without being detected as it crossed the
coastal defence lines. This allowed Canada
to resist U.S. pressure to shore up its
aerial protection of Sault Ste Marie and
Sudbury, in the heart of the Great Lakes
industrial zone. In Quebec, a Hawker Hurricane
squadron was posted permanently in Bagotville,
an air base specially created to protect
the Arvida aluminium production facilities.
In 1943, with Allied victories on all fronts,
the RCAF started shifting resources destined
for home defence towards more active theatres.
Between September and December 1943, HWE
fighter squadrons were dispatched overseas
and restructured in preparation for the
invasion of France. In December, two Canso
squadrons, Nos. 117 (BR) and 162 (BR) were
transferred to Iceland under the British
Coastal Command. Similar transfers took
place afterwards: as the Allies advanced
through Northwestern Europe, the HWE reduced
its resources in men and aircraft. Soon
after Germany’s surrender, airmen
were gradually demobilized. On September
15th, 1945, Eastern and Western Commands
had no longer men on active duty.
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Canada in WWII
