The
city of Cologne in March 1945
after several bombing raids.
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| National
Defence Image Library, PL 42542. |
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Between the two world wars, advances in
aeronautics were such that a theory was
born, claiming that, with aircraft flying
increasingly faster and higher, no country
could survive systematic high-explosive
and incendiary bomb strikes. Pre-emptive,
offensive bombing, that would crush the
enemy before it can engage in such action,
was therefore deemed to be the only way
to escape utter destruction. The doctrine
of strategic bombing resulted from that
theory.
In June 1940, with its European allies
fallen to the Third Reich, Great Britain
had lost access for a land attack against
Germany. Air strikes were then the only
offensive weapon available against the Nazis.
In July 1941, British chiefs of staff stated:
“We must destroy
the foundations upon which the war machine
rests, the economy which feeds it, the morale
which sustains it, the supplies which nourish
it, and the hopes of victory which inspire
it.”
Quoted in
Greenhous et al., p. 551
At that time, the British doctrine still
favoured precision bombing against military
objectives: factories producing military
equipment, oil and fuel refineries, naval
and air bases, etc. Most air raids targeted
the Ruhr, Germany’s industrial heart.
But results were disappointing: navigators
could not locate their targets in the dark
of the night and few bombs fell within three
miles (4.8 km) of their intended target.
The destruction effect was much less than
anticipated.
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Damages
resulting from bombing in a residential
area of Cologne. |
| National
Defence Image Library, PL 42543. |
|
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To obviate the inefficiency of precision
bombing, area bombing was experimented.
This new approach stated that air raids
should cause material damage to any structure
in the target’s vicinity. Area bombing
meant casualties among civilians, who would
be killed, wounded or left homeless, thus
impacting on both the population’s
morale and on the enemy’s production
capacity. Sir
Arthur Harris, Bomber Command’s
commanding officer since February 1942,
became the main proponent of that doctrine
that he submitted to the Chiefs of Staff
and to the British Government. Let us not
forget that Britain herself was being submitted
since 1940 to “terror bombings”,
i.e., night raids targeting civilian as
well as military objectives. Facing a desperate
situation – Nazi military successes
in Western and Eastern Europe, devastating
attacks against maritime traffic, uninterrupted
bombing raids against Britain – the
British Government considered that attacking
Germany’s civilian population was
justified.
In 1941 and 1942, area bombings did not
yield the expected results. Actually, bombing
raids were rather ineffective, while resulting
in a high number of casualties among Allied
air crews, the main causes being the aircraft
insufficient performances and the outstanding
German air defence system that bombers had
to defeat.
Mass Bombings
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Railway installations destroyed
in bombing raids in Trappes,
near Paris. The photograph is
dated September 9th, 1944.
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| National
Defence Image Library, PL 32254. |
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In order to break through German air defences
and maximize destructive power, Air Vice-Marshal
Sir Arthur Harris organized the first mass
bombing operation, code-named Millenium.
In the night of May 30th, 1942, 1,096 bombers
flew in successive waves over Cologne. The
raid, which lasted only two hours and a
half, caused destruction on an unprecedented
scale: 600 acres almost totally laid waste,
3,300 buildings destroyed, 2,500 fires started,
some 500 people killed. For Harris, this
demonstrated the power of Bomber Command
as a strategic weapon, one that could defeat
the Third Reich all by itself.
That raid set the pattern for bomber warfare
as it would be practiced until 1945. The
Casablanca Directive, under the joint responsibility
of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt
and of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill,
sanctioned by U.S. and British chiefs of
staff on January 21st, 1943, assigned the
following objective to bombing operations:
“the progressive
destruction and dislocation of the German
military, industrial and economic system
and the undermining of the morale of the
German people to a point where their capacity
for armed resistance is fatally weakened”
Quoted in Greenhous
et al., p. 657
While the Eighth U.S. Air Force attacked
by day, Sir Arthur Harris’ Bomber
Command engaged in night operations against
the very heart of the German Reich, its
capital, its major industrial centres, its
civilian population. Cities are practically
wiped out: Cologne, Essen, Dortmund, Düsseldorf,
Hanover, Mannheim...
The
Vokel (Netherlands) airfield pitted
with craters after a 6 Group attack,
September 3rd, 1944. |
| National
Defence Image Library, PL 32218. |
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In the night of October, 22nd to 23rd,
1943, Kassel was bombed: 155 industrial
sites were damaged, including three Henschel
factories, producing locomotives, tanks
and guns. Over half the city was destroyed:
8,500 people died, 100,000 were left homeless.
On the basis of data provided by the Air
Ministry, British press highlighted damages
inflicted to the war industry but downplayed
the impact on the civilian population, a
perspective that infuriated Harris, who
saw it as a misrepresentation of truth.
He believed that Bomber Command’s
prime objective had to be stated unequivocally.
“That aim is the destruction
of German cities, the killing of German
workers and the disruption of civilised
community life throughout Germany. It should
be emphasised that the destruction of houses,
public utilities, transport and lives; the
creation of a refugee problem on an unprecedented
scale; and the breakdown of morale both
at home and at the battle fronts by fear
of extended and intensified bombing are
accepted and intended aims of our bombing
policy, they are not by-products of attempts
to hit factories.”
Sir Arthur Harris, 25 October 1943, quoted
in Greenhous et al., p. 725.
In Hamburg, during the night of July 27th
to 28th, the heat and strong winds spread
the blazes started by the air raids, turning
the downtown core into a fiery inferno in
which 41,800 people lost their lives. Between
November 18th, 1943, and March 31st, 1944,
Allied bombers pounded Berlin; despite massive
destruction of industrial facilities and
administrative buildings, despite heavy
casualties in the civilian population, Germany
stood firm and morale did not collapse,
as expected.
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Daytime attack against Hanover,
March 25th, 1945.
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| National
Defence Image Library, PL 144266. |
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In April 1944, Bomber Command was placed
under the control of Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHEAF). In
the following months, bombing raids targeted
essentially the transportation infrastructure
– rail yards, railway lines, trains
– in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands,
in order to cut off the Normandy battleground
from Germany. Strategy reverted to precision
bombing in order to spare the friendly civilian
population. In Germany, however, area bombing
and the destruction of urban centres in
the north and west of the country were carried
on until 1945.
In Sir Arthur Harris’ opinion, strategic
bombing was, as an offensive operation,
as important as the opening of a new front.
Until D-Day, he was convinced that bombings,
if they were destructive enough, could force
Germany into submission without the Allied
casualties that were bound to result from
a massive landing operation in Continental
Europe. After D-Day, uninterrupted waves
of hundreds of bombers, carrying thousands
of bombs, kept on pounding German cities
every night, in an attempt to bring about
the collapse of the Third Reich.
In retrospect, we know that the Allies
won through a combination of ground, naval
and air operations. It is only after V-E
Day, that some light could be shed on the
actual effects of bombings. Despite the
massive destruction suffered by Germany,
the morale of the civilian population remained
quite high until the very last few months.
In addition, if the war industry was indeed
slowed down by bombings, it was never brought
to a complete halt; being very decentralized,
it could escape raids that focused mostly
on urban centres.
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